ABSTRACT <AB>This paper provides a theoretical and methodological contribution to the heated debate on intersubjectivity and intersubjectification
1.
Introduction Narrog, 2010 Narrog, , 2012 Dancygier & Sweetser, 2012) . The theoretical framework of this study is based on Tantucci's (2013 Tantucci's ( , 2014b distinction between immediate and extended dimensions of intersubjectivity. While the former is bound to the mutual awareness of speaker/writer and addressee/hearer (IMMEDIATE INTERSUBJECTIVITY, I-I), the latter includes an assumed third party (specific or generic) who has a social bearing on the utterance (EXTENDED INTERSUBJECTIVITY, E-I) (cf. Tantucci, 2013 Tantucci, , 2014b . The main claim of this work is that, along a unidirectional cline of change (cf. Traugott, 1999 , extended intersubjectification constitutes a further stage of semantic and/or grammatical reanalysis with respect to its immediate counterpart.
This approach is theoretically and methodologically compatible with the most recent and influential accounts of intersubjectivity and intersubjectification (cf. Traugott, 1999 Nuyts, 2001 Nuyts, , 2012 White, 2003; Martin & White, 2005; Verhagen, 2005; Narrog, 2010 Narrog, , 2012 Dancygier & Sweetser, 2012) , yet it provides new operational tools to study the relationship between semasiological change and intersubjective construing. The diachronic continuum from immediate to extended intersubjectification that I will discuss in this paper is thus aimed at providing a theoretical and methodological complement to the studies proposed in the literature.
This work is organized as follows: in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, I provide a general overview of the notion of intersubjectivity in the literature and a theoretical and empirical distinction between immediate (I-I) and extended intersubjectivity (E-I). In Section 3, I provide some corpus-illustrated 1 (cf. Tummers, Heylen, & Geeraerts, 2005, p. 235) evidence about the diachronic continuum from I-I to E-I through the analysis of the construction 干嘛 gànma 'do what' in Mandarin. In Section 4, I
discuss the applicability and the theoretical relevance of the present framework to the most recent studies on intersubjectification. Section 5 is then dedicated to two corpus-based studies about the I-I and E-I process of the constructions [you don't want X] and believe it or not in American English.
Intersubjectivity: immediate vs. extended
In this section I will provide a brief overview of the notion of intersubjectivity. I will then draw a conceptual and empirical distinction between immediate (Section 2.1) and extended (Section 2.2) intersubjectivity.
INTERSUBJECTIVITY: AN OVERVIEW
In cognitive psychology, intersubjectivity is generally discussed with reference to the so-called theory of mind (ToM) or mindreading (i.e., Goldman, 2006) . More specifically, ToM refers the ability to attribute mental states -beliefs, intents, desires, pretending, knowledge, etc. -to oneself 1 In Section 2.3, I provide a detailed description of this terminology.
the conceptual awareness of the 'self' (subjectivity) and the 'self' plus the other persona involved in the interaction (intersubjectivity) can be alternatively profiled through specific linguistic coding.
According to Traugott's distinction, the former represents the meaning indexing speaker attitude and viewpoint, whereas the latter involves to a greater degree the SP/W's attention on the AD/R's self-image.
What is distinctive in her framework is the effective applicability of (inter)subjectivity to diachronic phenomena of semantic and or grammatical reanalysis. Subjectified polysemies may occur in evaluations of others, e.g., silly which originally meant 'blessed, innocent', but later on came to be reanalysed as 'stupid'. Subjectification may similarly affect / relate to the relative position on a scale: take an adverb like pretty 'cleverly', which was successively used with the implied meaning of 'attractively' and later also as a modifier with a function similar to 'rather' (Traugott, 2010, p. 32) . Similar to Traugott, Sweetser points out that subjectification can involve the attitude toward the truth of a proposition, as observable in the shift from the deontic to the epistemic meaning of must (Sweetser, 1990, p. 61) . Similarly, Tantucci provides a statistical model to observe the diachronic increase of certainty of epistemic verbs as a process of subjectification (cf. Tantucci, 2014a) . A more fine-grained account of different construals of subjectivity is given by De Smet and Verstraete (2006, p. 385) who provide a distinction between pragmatic usages, ideational usages (having to do with meanings pertaining to the extra-discursive world), and interpersonal usages of a construction (semantically addressing the interaction between SP/W and AD/R).
That being said, as Traugott points out, a prominently intersubjective reanalysis of a construction involves the semantic shift from a more SP/W's centred meaning (comparatively more subjective) to a new one focusing mostly on the AD/R (comparatively more intersubjective). She provides evidence for discourse markers in English functioning as hedges, constructions encoding politeness (as in the case of the more schematic please from the formulaic if you please) or impoliteness, euphemisms (pass away for die) and others.
IMMEDIATE INTERSUBJECTIVITY
Whether it is from a synchronic or a diachronic perspective, all the accounts of intersubjectivity discussed so far are mainly centred on the here-and-now of the conversation, or in other words, the awareness that the speakers have of each other during a speech event or a connection. As an illustration, consider the intersubjectified meaning of actually discussed by Traugott (2003, p. 129) in the examples below:
<LDIS> (1) I will drive you to the dentist.
(2) Actually, I will drive you to the dentist. Sweetser, 1990, p. 61: Not in Refs.
Comment [AS9]:

>> Added to refernces (highlighted in yellow)
.
<X>
In (1) the SP/W does not mark overtly his awareness of the interlocutor as a subjective 'other persona' with specific attitudes, and feelings. Conversely, with the use of actually in (2) SP/W prevents AD/R's from disagreeing with the proposition, with an implied attempt to mitigate it. The latter could be paraphrased as Aware of what you might say, I am telling you P. In this sense, the intersubjective awareness conveyed by actually in (2) does not exceed the here-and-now of the conversation, as it only pertains to SP/W and AD/R. In Tantucci (2013, p. 217; 2014b) 
EXTENDED INTERSUBJECTIVITY
A point that in the literature has been often neglected is that intersubjective awareness can also go beyond the boundaries of the here-and-now of the speech event and reach other specific personas, groups of people, or even society as whole. At this point, the notion of 'you' turns into the notion of 'you and someone else(s)' and a proposition P acquires an indirect social deixis. Consider again the pair below (from Tantucci, 2013, p. 218) :
<LDIS>
(1) I will drive you to the dentist.
(2) (a) Actually, I will drive you to the dentist, I've just spoken with your mother.
<X>
Actually in (2a) does not simply encode SP/W's awareness of him/herself and the AD/R as two isolated interlocutors, but also exceeds the immediate ground of the conversation, including a third party (3rdP), specifically AD/R's mother (Tantucci, 2013, p. 218 (Tantucci, 2013, p. 218; 2014b) In Figure 2 , the speech participants are deictically connected to a 3rdP, a 'someone else' who is assumed to potentially confirm, approve, or judge the interlocutor's propositions. As we will see, along a semasiological cline of change, the marked awareness 3rdP tends to be intersubjectified as a generic third persona(s), an assumed group of people or even society as a whole. Example (3) is from the spoken section of the BNC (British National Corpus) and is characterized by an E-I usage of actually: <LDIS> (3) They had to perhaps give up their pots and pans, or they were supposed to. Actually, a remarkably few were collected, to provide brass for armaments. 4 This extended-intersubjective meaning of (3) is here intended as one of the possible polysemies that actually acquired with a new discourse marker (DM) function throughout a diachronic process of semasiological reanalysis (cf. Traugott, 2003, p. 170) . This point will be discussed in more detail the current section. 5 In cognitive linguistics, construals are generally defined as "one of the countless ways of conceiving and portraying the situation in question" (cf. Langacker, 2008, p. 4) However, while SP/W's proposition in (3) also profiles the intent to prevent some virtual comment or objection, nonetheless, AD/R is no longer a specific interlocutor (s/he could be anyone). In addition to that, SP/W's intersubjective awareness here exceeds the here-and-now of the conversation and reaches a general 3rdP assumed to be also aware of the proposition. That is, rather than functioning as a mere DM, this particular usage of actually conveys interpersonal evidentiality (cf. Tantucci, 2013 as it marks a proposition as a piece of knowledge shared by SP/W together with some other persona(s) who could potentially confirm the truthfulness of P. In this sense, SP/W here states what S/HE HAS COME TO KNOW, rather than what is REAL/ACTUAL in an absolute sense. This form of construal necessarily needs to include the awareness of an AD/R (more or less bleached) and the one of an external 3rdP, indirectly supporting SP/W's proposition (see Figure 2) . A similar intersection between the here proposed extended-intersubjectivty and evidential reasoning is more broadly at issue in Nuyts' (2001a Nuyts' ( , 2001b account of intersubjectivity, which he defines as the dimension where SP/W markedly indicates that "s/he is not the only person who has access to the evidence", but is rather part of "a larger group of people who share the same conclusion based on it".
As an evidential marker, the DM actually in (3) (a) It seems that a remarkably few were collected, to provide brass for armaments.
[ 
Finally, it is worth observing that, despite the spoken nature of both examples, actually in (3) was originally employed in a monologue, thus not addressing a proposition previously uttered by a specific interlocutor. This point will turn out to be of crucial importance in the ensuing analyses of this work.
From I-I to E-I: introductory evidence from Mandarin
From a methodological point of view, the bulk of recent approaches to (inter)subjectification generally aim at answering a fundamental question: Given the form-meaning pair L (lexeme) what changes did meaning M of L undergo? (Geeraerts, 1997) . This question is at the core of the historical linguistic framework known as semasiology.
In semasiological studies, the form of L (its morphosyntactic and morphophonological properties) through time generally remains constant or undergoes only minor morphophonological changes. The main focus is thus on the development of polysemies within the same construction. 
>>Added (highlighted in yellow).
An example of semasiological reanalysis can be the chunk AS LONG AS meaning originally 'equal in length' with the added semantic connotation of 'equal in time' and the further one of 'provided that'. The same can be noted for even originally conveying 'evenly', then reanalysed with the additional connotation of 'unexpected member of set of alternatives' (Traugott & Dasher, 2002, p. 25; see also Brinton & Traugott, 2005 ).
The semasiological model can be schematically represented as in (5) (from Traugott & Dasher, 2002, p. 25) :
As can be observed from (5) The scheme in (5) is a symbolic representation of semasiological change; it is then not specified which kind of cognitive or pragmatic mechanism is leading to the development of M 2 . Crucially, when a semasiological approach is concerned with diachronic phenomena of (inter)subjectification, the focus is on the cognitive construals and pragmatic motivations determining newly subjectified or intersubjectifed meaning(s) M n of a construction or lexeme L. This latter domain of inquiry constitutes one of the main models of analysis in the present study. In other words, we will focus on the semasiological reanalysis of a construction or lexeme L when motivated by cognitive and pragmatic construals of (inter)subjectivity (cf. Traugott & Trousdale, 2013 , on the intersections between semasiology and constructional change).
In the next section, I will provide a corpus-illustrated (cf. Tummers et al., 2005, p. 235) case of semasiological change from I-I to E-I about the Mandarin construction 干嘛 gànma 'what (are you) doing'. The term 'corpus-illustrated' refers to a corpus technique frequently adopted in historical linguistics. As the term suggests, it is generally used to illustrate when new stages of semantic or grammatical reanalysis are attested as a new construction first appears in a diachronic corpus (influential accounts based on corpus-illustrated techniques can be found in Traugott, , 1999 Bybee, Perkins, & Pagliuca, 1994; Hopper & Traugott, 2003; and others) .
The main purpose of this introductory study will be to give some preliminary evidence regarding the diachronic continuum from I-I to E-I in languages other than English. Two ensuing corpusbased studies will then be focused on the two chunks [you don't want to X] 7 and believe it or not in American English. All the analyses that will be provided in this work are mainly grounded in the frameworks of chunking (cf. Newell, 1990; Bybee, 2010) and invited inferencing theory (IIT) (Traugott, 1999 . More specifically, the present study aligns with the view that "the underlying cognitive basis for morphosyntax and its hierarchical organization is the chunking of sequential experiences" which occurs mainly with repetition (Newell, 1990; Haiman, 1994; Bybee, 2003 Bybee, , 2010 . This notion applies to morphemes, words, and larger formulaic patterns and is centred on semantic-pragmatic reanalyses due to newly acquired meaning in context. When two or more smaller chunks occur together with some degree of frequency, then a larger chunk containing the smaller ones is formed. Frequently used phrases and newly formed chunks are processed holistically, which implies "that rather than accessing each unit separately and putting them in a construction, a whole sequence is accessed at once". This does not entail that the parts of a chunk are not identifiable, "but continued access as a whole contributes to the weakening of their identifiability and thus the analyzability and/or compositionality of the whole expression"
(cf. Bybee, 2010, p. 52). gàn 'to do' and the end-sentence emphatic modal particle 嘛 ma 9 (cf. Lü, 1999; Shen, 2003; Qiang, 2007 Qiang, , 2008 . This chunk is the result of a phonetic and morphological reduction from the construct 干什么 gàn shénme 'doing what' which, despite the absence of a second person pronoun, can be translated with expression What are you doing?
The first occurrence of 干嘛 gànma occurring in the diachronic section of the PKU-CCL-CORPUS (Peking Center for Chinese Linguistics Corpus) 10 is from the 清 Qīng dynasty . This first usage presents a comparatively less-subjective (rather literal) reading:
7 The brackets are meant to bound the construction including an X slot (cf. Goldberg, 1995) . 8 Analyzability and compositionality will be formally introduced in the next subsection.
9 It can alternatively be transcribed with the final interrogative particle 吗 ma or the morpheme 么 me. From a semasiological perspective, the new rhetoric meaning emerging from (7) corresponds to a crystallized invited inference (cf. Traugott & Dasher, 2002, p. 16) or generalized conversational implicature (cf. Levinson, 1995) which is now directly identifiable with the preverbal construction 干嘛 ganma, independently from the context in which it is used. That is to say, the rhetorical interrogative function of (7) corresponds to the generalization of a conversational implicature that prior to this stage could only arise in context, while now it is inherently part of the semantic-11 Interrogative particle. Levinson, 1995: Not in Refs.
Comment [AS20]:
>> Change into Levinson, 2000 (new reference added, highlighted in yello) pragmatic meaning of the construction. The comparatively higher degree of reanalysis of (7) with respect to (6) is also due to a lower degree of COMPOSITIONALITY (Langacker, 1987; Bybee, 2010) and ANALYZABILITY (Langacker, 1987) . The former has to do with the semantics of a construction and refers to the degree of predictability of the meaning of the whole from the meaning of the component parts (cf. Bybee, 2010, p. 45 ). The latter is grammatical notion and regards the recognition of the contribution that each component makes to the composite conceptualization (cf. Langacker, 1987, p. 292) . Namely, (6) is comparatively more compositional as the verb 干 gàn 'to do/to act' and its object (什)么 (shén)me 'what' literally refer to some action or activity to be carried out by an actor. On the other hand, the preverbal chunk 干 嘛 gànmà in (7) is less compositional as it does not describe an actor's action/activity but rather challenges the plausibility of his/her choice. Similarly, (6) is more analyzable than (7), as in the former case 干嘛 gànmà grammatically corresponds to the predicate 12 of the sentence, while in the latter it occurs in a preverbal position functioning as a mood operator (it can be replaced with 为什么 wèishénme 'why'). Finally, (6) and (7) correspond to two different speech acts, as in the former case SP/W's presumption of optimal relevance (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1995) is to genuinely understand the reason why AD/R 'has come to Beijing'. Quite differently, (7) corresponds to a face-threatening act (cf. Brown & Levinson, 1987) as SP/W pragmatically aims at criticizing AD/R's decision.
Interestingly, since the 1950s, 干嘛 gànma starts to appear in declarative sentences (before then it could only be used in interrogatives) and with first person (generally plural) pronouns.
Consider example (8) below:
yǒu de tóngzhì shuō, wǒmen gāng guòshàng diǎn hǎo rìzi， gànma yào qù exist PART 13 comrade say, we just pass-through bit good day, ganma want go
12 In Chinese linguistics, the notion of predicate generally includes the following object or any other element occurring in a postverbal position.
13 Structural particle.
take this CLAS 14 risk.
'Some comrades say, we've just had a decent day, we shouldn't go and take such a risk.'
As can be noted from (8) above, due to a new E-I reanalysis, the chunk is now comparatively less compositional and analyzable than (7): the syntactic subject of 干嘛 gànma no longer obligatorily corresponds to a specific AD/R, the proposition occurs in the declarative mood, and the construction now functions as a preverbal deontic marker expressing negative mood, translatable as as anyone would agree, we shouldn't/mustn't P. The new semantic-pragmatic and grammatical reanalysis of the construction includes an assumed 3rdP who could indirectly confirm the good sense of SP/W's proposition and at this stage can be employed in monologues and written registers.
From (7) to (8), we can observe a shift in profile from a more AD/R-oriented meaning (I-I) to a newer 3rdP-oriented one (E-I), as the construction has acquired a new social and indirect deixis.
From I-I to E-I: a complement to the existing models of analysis
This is not the first study holding that intersubjectivity not only pertains to the speech participants engaging in a conversation not being necessarily 'immediate'. Nuyts (2001 Nuyts ( , 2012 characterizes intersubjectivity more broadly than the traditional I-I dimension, pointing out that intersubjective can be considered the SP/W's attempt to share the responsibility of an assertion. This approach is based on the semantic-pragmatic intersection between intersubjectivity and evidentiality, and inspired a number of works in modal epistemic and evidential studies (e.g., Cornillie, 2004 Cornillie, , 2007 Tantucci, 2013 Tantucci, , 2014b ). An additional study worth mentioning is the one proposed by Narrog (2010, 2012) , who first considers a possible further step of semantic reanalysis after the (I-I) one along the Traugottian cline of intersubjectification. 15 He first points out that in the modal domain, other than subjectification (as increased orientation towards the speaker) and intersubjectification (as increased orientation towards the hearer), there seems to be a third tendency of change. The example he provides is from Coates (Narrog, 2010, p. 31; 2012, p. 36) : <LDIS> (9) I looked at some of my portraits and grotesque as they may be, they capture some aspects of reality. (Coates, 1983, p. 135) 14 Classifier.
15 I label intersubjectification in the Traugottian sense as immediate-intersubjectification (I-I) in Section 2.1. Cornillie, 2004 : Not in Refs.
Comment [AS21]:
>> Change into Conrillie 2009
<X> Narrog argues that the concessive usage of may in (9) is primarily intersubjective, as the SP/W seems to take into account a virtual objection or criticism by AD/R and hence provides a counterargument to it. He further claims that, beyond this form of intersubjective meaning, may also syntactically functions as a binding-component supporting the textual coherence of the discourse.
This phenomenon is what he defines as 'discourse orientation', which he considers a further stage of reanalysis after the well-known ones of subjectification and intersubjectification. Despite this remarkable intuition, a discourse-oriented reading is felicitous for ex-intersubjective constructions contributing to the overall coherence of the text or the discourse, but not as explicative for highly idiomatic chunks appearing in isolation. Consider the pair of the intersubjective idiom you got to be joking reported below: Quite differently, in (11), you gotta be joking functions as an E-I construction (cf. Tantucci, 2013 Tantucci, , 2014b as the intersubjective construal of the chunk is not limited to the speech event and not exclusively addressed to a specific AD/R. With this performative expression, one of the dwarves expresses a feeling of incredulity towards an unexpected event, rather replying to a previous utterance. Additionally, the construction is uttered in the form of a monologue, with the assumption that anyone would agree and sympathize with it: his companions (AD/R) together with any other member of society (3rdP). At this point of semasiological reanalysis, the second person pronoun you is not addressed to a specific single persona and the expression got to be joking is not a response to a statement previously made by an interlocutor. An ideal paraphrase of the expression in (11) would be as anyone would agree, this is impossible! Intuitively, it would be strained to consider the highly intersubjectified form in (11) as a 'discourse-oriented' construction in Narrog's sense. It rather appears as a very idiomatic exclamation in isolation, completely detached from any ongoing discourse. The chunk in (11) is comparatively less compositional in that the holistic meaning this is impossible! is not directly inferable from the meaning of the separate components of the construction: you gotta be joking. It is similarly not highly analyzable in that the pronoun you has lost its original second person singular deixis and the reduced epistemic gotta is not referring to an animate subject.
17
Back to Narrog's observation, the discourse-orientation of E-I constructions is indeed a most likely phenomenon as the latter frequently appears in monologues and in the written language.
Nonetheless, it needs to be observed that the primary meaning of E-I constructions such as (10-11) is the assumed awareness of a 3rdP, rather than the attempt to bind discourse coherence. To explain, the binding function of may in (9) is undeniable; however, the fundamental meaning of the chunk is again the assumed encoding of a 3rdP as an assumed external interlocutor: grotesque as they may be (considered by someone), they capture some aspect of reality. Even in this more discourseoriented usage, the core meaning of may is the assumed 3rdP as an inherent element of the construction. That being said, it is a fact that E-I constructions often do show a new discourseorientation, not present at previous I-I stages of reanalysis.
18
To conclude this section, I propose that extended-intersubjectivity is to be intended as a new 3rdP-oriented reanalysis of an original I-I counterpart. E-I is characterized by a comparatively lower degree of analyzability, compositionality, and a most likely -though not absolute -new discourseorientation. Drawing on Traugott's cline, I add a further E-I stage of intersubjectification whereby 3rdP inherently becomes a semantic element of the construction. Below, I quote Traugott's (2010, p. 44) original pathway of change from subjectification to intersubjectification: <NL> 17 On a scale, the degree of analyzability of a construction is often indirectly proportional to its degree of schematicity and abstraction (cf. Croft & Cruse, 2004; Trousdale, 2012) . On the other hand, the present work is centred on semasiological phenomena of semantic-pragmatic change whereby formal reduction and atomicity are not fundamental -nor the only -criteria for judging the degree of semantic reanalysis of a construction (cf. Traugott & Dasher, 2002, p. 25) .
18 See data from the survey of believe it or not in Section 5.3.
a. meanings are recruited by the speaker to encode and regulate attitudes and beliefs (subjectification), and, b. once subjectified, may be recruited to encode meanings centred on the addressee (intersubjectification).
<X>
The basic cline of intersubjectification she provides is the following (Traugott, 2010, p. 35 
The distinction between I-I and E-I is not confined to the linguistic domain. It rather tackles the broader opposition in cognitive psychology between a neurologically triggered form of 'simulation theory' (ST) of mindreading from a more generalised and folk-psychologically acquired 'theorytheory' (TT) of others' minds (cf. Goldman, 2006) . While the former holds that a conceptualizer directly simulates in his/her own mind the physical, emotional, or epistemic status of another individual, the latter has to do with an inferential and 'information-based' process of mindreading, not necessarily bound to the neurological simulation of another mind's condition. In fact, if a semasiological continuum can be attested from a more direct form of mindreading to a more extended and generalized one, it would then be possible to count on new evidence confirming the ST and TT are not mutually exclusive, but in diachronic connection with one another.
The intersubjectification of [you don't want X] and believe it or not in American English
In this section I will provide two detailed corpus-based surveys about the tendency towards E-I of the constructions [you don't want X] and believe it or not in American English (AE). The aim of these two case studies will be to support the hypothesis of a semasiological continuum from I-I to E-I on a quantitative level.
THE INTERSUBJECTIFICATION OF [you don't want X]: ANALYSIS CRITERIA AND SCOPE OF ENQUIRY
In this section I will discuss the criteria which have been adopted to analyze quantitatively and qualitatively the semasiological reanalysis of [you don't want X] in AE. More specifically, I will focus on the progressive I-I and E-I process of change of [you don't want X] from 1810 up to 1920 in the COHA, 19 a 400 million word diachronic corpus of American English.
The methodology I adopted for this survey is based on the frameworks of chunking (Bybee, 2010) and invited inferencing theory (Traugott, 1999 , which both hold that along a process of semantic-pragmatic (and potentially grammatical) reanalysis, frequently made inferences from the context become part of the meaning of a chunk: "This suggests no clear divide between aspects of the meaning that are derivable from context and those that are inherent to the lexical item or construction" (Ibid.; see also . In other words, new constructions or formulaic patterns are specific exemplars of more general existing constructions "that take on new pragmatic implications, meanings due to their use in particular contexts" (Bybee, 2010, p. 28 does not always represent a determining factor for the semantic-pragmatic and/or grammatical reanalysis of a construction. What is most crucial is rather the distribution and the usage of the chunk in context. This entails that the chunk itself will progressively turn into a new unit, the internal constituency of which will be characterized by a progressive diminishing of analyzability and compositionality.
b. Corpus-driven evidence from the present survey does not indicate a different distribution of word classes in the X slot at different stages of semasiological change.
<X> For this reason, what will we be looking for is a new intersubjectified (both I-I and E-I)
employment of the whole chunk on a pragmatic-semantic level, which can be formally and statistically distinguished from less reanalysed (more literal) ones.
To achieve this, it was necessary to divide the usages of [you don't want X] into three main categories: less-subjective, immediate-intersubjective, and extended-intersubjective. As the original semantics of the chunk is already oriented towards the AD/R, the cline does not include a marked subjectified stage, but rather a direct shift from L-S to I-I. The formal criteria appearing in Table 1 have been established due to corpus-based reduction of analyzability and compositionality of the chunk (see Section 3.2 for more details) as well as determined by corpus-driven analysis of the data:
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
L-S -old information (AD/R already knows about P) -occurring in questions, hypotheticals, or as a confirmation of the state of affairs related to AD/R (in the latter case often introduced by so or that). -question asked or hypothesis made to a specific AD/R -you is addressed to a specific AD/R
I-I -new information (AD/R does not know about P)
-used as an assertive speech act -presuppositional meaning based on the specific knowledge of AD/R -you is addressed to a specific AD/R -you cannot be replaced with one
E-I -new information (AD/R does not know about P) -used as an assertive speech act -presuppositional meaning addressing AD/R as well as a general 3rdP -you is addressed to AD/R and to 'anyone else' in his/her place -you can be replaced with one TABLE 1. Criteria adopted for the analysis of the intersubjectification of [you don't want X]
From the three examples below we can first learn how to apply the criteria in Table 1 Table 1 , the three examples above respectively correspond to instances of L-S, I-I, and E-I. To explain, in (14) [you don't want X] is labelled as L-S as it appears in a hypothetical construction, objectively -or rather, less-subjectively -reporting in the protasis a piece of old information, some state of affairs SP/W and AD/R are both aware of: you don't want to have anything to do with him. Despite the second person pronoun you and the proposition referring specifically to AD/R, the construction has not idiomatically acquired an AD/R's oriented meaning as it does not constitute an independent assertive speech act.
Quite differently, the chunk in (15) assertively. However, it now conveys a more generic awareness of the AD/R (it could be directed to anyone) as well as an assumed 3rdP, who is supposed to react exactly as the AD/R would: after fasting so long you (as anyone else) don't want to eat too much at first. In other words, the shift from I-I to E-I corresponds to a reanalysis from a personal meaning (oriented towards the AD/R), to a social one (extended to a generic 3rdP). The mismatch between I-I and E-I is easily tested by substituting you with (no-)one (see Table 1 ):
(15) (a) *No one wants to be married. You are too young -you are.
[
E-I]
(16) (a) But, after fasting so long no one wants to eat too much at first.
<X>
It is important to point out that I-I and E-I here correspond to two different speech acts: while in (15) SP/W's presumption of optimal relevance (cf. Sperber & Wilson, 1995, pp. 266-278) is to express his/her knowledge and understanding of a specific addressee, on the other hand, the optimal relevance in (16) is presumed to be achieved by conveying a social meaning, a theory of mind of how anyone would react in that specific context. As I pointed out in Section 2.4, the semasiological reanalysis from I-I to E-I is characterized by a reduction of the analyzability and compositionality of the chunk. In the former case, the personal pronoun you has lost its second person deixis, now referring more generally to anyone. Similarly, the chunk is less compositional in that the emerging meaning of the construction is felicitously paraphrased as no-one wants and does not refer anymore to a specific will on behalf of the AD/R.
One last point that needs to be made is that the pronoun you itself corresponds to a construction undergoing a process of semantic-pragmatic reanalysis. This is due to the loss of a L-S second person deixis. Nonetheless, the main focus of this survey lays on the semasiological change of the whole chunk [you don't want X] as an idiomatic, holistic function of E-I. It is a fact that E-I idiomatic usages of the chunk [you don't want X] such as the one in (16) are not present in various non-Germanic languages (i.e., Romance, Sinitic, and others).
THE INTERSUBJECTIFICATION OF [you don't want X] IN AE
In this section I will provide corpus-based evidence from the COHA related to a 120-year period from 1810 up to the end of 1920. 20 Based on the criteria given in Table 1 , I analyzed all the 1,166
occurrences of the chunk year by year, dividing the usages once again in L-S, I-I, and E-I as given in Then I first calculated the normalized frequency (NF) per decade of all the intersubjectified usages of the chunk. This was done in order to find out if a general process of intersubjectification did actually occur during the period I considered. The result of this calculation is reported in Figure   3 .
<Figure 3 about here> 20 This choice is corpus-driven. Not many usages are found at the beginning of the nineteenth century (when the COHA starts); as a result, it was necessary to take into account a large time span to observe statistically significant results. (18) is still a form of L-S in that it is still perfectly analyzable and compositional, still communicating a piece of old information (the AD/R is told about something s/he already knows).
However, in this case the construction does not appear in an embedded clause, but is rather employed as a request of confirmation of a previous state of affairs in the form of a rhetorical question: [you don't want X, do you?] . This construction occurs extremely frequently in the COHA as it represents a bridging function from a non-assertive to an assertive stance. In fact, the old piece of information is expressed as a form of inference or assumption rather than an absolute state of affairs. In a similar fashion, (19) To exemplify the intersubjectification process from (17) to (21) I drew a diachronic semantic map (cf. Anderson, 1986; Heine, 1992; Van der Auwera & Plungian, 1998; Croft, 2001; Haspelmath, 2003) including most of the criteria I adopted for my analysis (see Figure 6 ).
<Figure 6 about here> 
THE I-I AND E-I OF believe it or not IN AE
The present study is a corpus-based analysis of all the occurrences of the chunk believe it or not in the COHA across 160 years time from 1810 up to 1960. 24 As in the case of [you don't want X], the main aim of this survey is to find further empirical confirmation of the semasiological continuum from I-I to E-I, and thus from a more specific form of mindreading to a more generalized one.
Adopting the same methodology given in Section 3.1, the usages of believe it or not have been divided into less-subjective, immediate-intersubjective, and extended-intersubjective). All the corpus-driven criteria (both syntactic and semantic-pragmatic) that have been adopted in this survey are summarized in Table 3 .
<Table 3 about here> 24 Similar to the previous survey, this choice is also corpus-driven. Not many usages are found at the beginning of the nineteenth century (when the COHA starts). For this reason it was necessary to take into account a large time span to statistically observe some significant results. interactor's feelings or wants. Quite differently, the latter is no longer characterized by a negative prosody 25 (cf. Sinclair, 1991) , as it is used to introduce a piece of new information, the optimal relevance of which is to express the awareness of how anyone would feel while hearing/reading what IS ABOUT TO BE narrated. The neutral prosody of (24) is confirmed by the fact that believe it or not can be felicitously replaced with other parenthetical DMs such as hard to believe or unexpectedly, while this is not possible in (23). In this case, it is also possible to observe a new discourse-oriented function of the E-I construction, now "contributing to the overall coherence of the text or the discourse" (Narrog, 2010, p. 31; 2012, p. 36) . 
could be analyzed as either a I-I or an E-I construction. That is, while (25) functions unequivocally as an independent clause occurring in the imperative mood and focusing on a specific AD/R, on the other hand, (26) can either be interpreted as a parenthetical E-I construction functioning as a DM (carrying an impersonal meaning) or also as an I-I chunk addressed to a specific AD/R. In fact, while (25) can only be interpreted as a positive face-threatening act, (26) is ambiguous as it may or may not be characterized by a negative prosody. This is easily demonstrated by the possibility of replacing believe it or not with similar DMs such as unexpectedly or strange as it may seem in (26), while this is clearly more problematic in the case of (25):
25 Negative prosody is here intended from a constructional perspective. That is to say, it takes the whole constructionrather than a word -to be perceived with a negative association.
<LDIS> [I-I]
(25) (a) *Strange as it may seem, you poor old back number -retorted Raleigh, hotly. -It alters nothing.
[I-I/E-I]
(26) (a) Strange as it may seem, it is the truth, and I have the three boys to prove it.
<X>
In Table 4 are summarized all the 217 occurrences of the chunk over the sixteen decades As can be observed (the y-axis indicates the NF of believe it or not) there is a sharp increase of intersubjectified usages of the construction starting from the beginning of the twentieth century.
As could be easily predicted, the intersubjectification occurring from the first eight decades to the second eighty-year time span is statistically significant (p < .0001).
The second hypothesis to be verified was the diachronic continuum from I-I to E-I. Or, in other words, whether I-I usages would constitute a bridging function for the development of further reanalysed E-I ones. A visual account of this phenomenon is provided in Figure 8 , where it is possible to observe separately the NF of both I-I and E-I usages of the chunk. To conclude, what these numbers can tell us is that, similar to what we found for [you don't want X], believe it or not also underwent a process of I-I and E-I. Most importantly, E-I occurred as a subsequent stage of reanalysis after an earlier I-I employment of the construction.
Conclusion
This paper provided a complementing framework to address synchronically and diachronically the hotly debated notion of intersubjectification (Traugott, 1999 Nuyts, 2001 Nuyts, , 2012 Verhagen, 2005; Narrog, 2010 Narrog, , 2012 Dancygier & Sweetser, 2012) . It claims and demonstrates that intersubjectivity can be codified either with respect to an immediate or an extended dimension (cf. Tantucci, 2013 Tantucci, , 2014b ) the former being bound to the mutual awareness of speaker/writer and addressee/hearer (immediate intersubjectivity), the latter including an assumed third party (specific or generic) who has a social bearing on the utterance (extended Change into 'i.e. Traugott & Dasher 2002; intersubjectivity). It discusses corpus-illustrated and corpus-based data showing that along a unidirectional cline of change (cf. Traugott, 1999 , E-I constitutes a later stage of semantic-pragmatic and/or grammatical reanalysis with respect to its immediate counterpart. I analyzed this phenomenon qualitatively and quantitatively, focusing on specific examples from Mandarin and American English. The diachronic continuum from I-I to E-I presented in this work can constitute an effective theoretical and operational complement to the studies proposed in the literature.
